Abstract: Most "leading" economics departments no longer teach the History of Economic Thought. Prominent macroeconomists nevertheless frequently deploy inaccurate accounts of the earlier development of ideas as rhetorical devices. These same economists have, however, also taught us that an understanding of how the economy functions helps condition the behaviour of maximising agents. The History of Economic thought documents the evolution of that understanding, so it is hard to see how economic history, which is the source of all the time series data which form the empirical basis of macroeconomics, can be interpreted without its help. Some implications of this insight are discussed and illustrated.
2 I have discussed all of these matters extensively in Laidler (1991 Laidler ( , 1999 , but in no case do I claim to have been the first commentator to have pointed out the often stark contradictions between the actual history of particular ideas and modern myths about them. Michael Woodford 5 After freeing himself of the straightjacket (or discipline) imposed by the classical postulates, Keynes described a model in which rules of thumb, such as the consumption function and liquidity preference schedule, took the place of decision functions that a classical economist would insist be derived from the theory of choice. And rather than require that wages and prices be determined by the postulates that markets clear -which for the labor market seemed patently contradicted by the severity of business depressions -Keynes took as an unexamined postulate that money wages are sticky, meaning that they are set at a level or by a process that could be taken as uninfluenced by the macroeconomic forces he proposed to analyse" (Lucas and Sargent 1978, pp. 304-305) As a description of the approach to cycle theory that Lucas and Sargent were trying to establish in 1978, and of its contrast to what, in the textbooks of the 1970s, was passing for "Keynesian economics", and making due allowance for the polemical nature of the paper in which it appeared, this passage is fair enough. But it purports to be, not a summary of a new research agenda, but an account of the history of an important branch of economic thought.
Judged as such, and to put it kindly, it leaves much to be desired: the business cycle, let alone the credit cycle, was a mainstay in the literature of economics from the early 1860s onwards; those who wrote about it took it for granted that markets didn't clear; some, who forged what Axel Leijonhufvud (1981) called "the Wicksell connection" located the problem in the capital market, and others, notably Marshall and Pigou, argued that wage stickiness, the reasons for which were extensively examined, both played a part in market failure, and underlay the fact that prices and output moved together; economists who insisted on decision functions derived from the theory of choice as a basis for cycle theory were few and far between before 1936; in the General Theory, which was not about the cycle, Keynes explicitly denied that his theoretical results depended upon wage stickiness; etc.
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(1999) provides a balanced and carefully nuanced account of the evolution of macroeconomics in the 20 th century, written from the viewpoint of a modern practitioner.
6
Nor is this passage an isolated example of the misrepresentation of the history of economics by modern monetary economists. Lucas himself (1996) returned to the discussion of the history of classical and neo-classical monetary economics in his Nobel Lecture along lines related to those which he and Sargent had followed in (1978) . Blaug (2001) Friedman's (1956 Friedman's ( , 1974 claims about the "Chicago tradition" have been much debated over the years, and some of them, particularly those made in 1956 about the allegedly unique role played in that tradition by a stable demand for money function, have not withstood careful examination. But Friedman's (1974) argument, that the Chicago Department was home to a lively group of economists who discussed the great contraction in monetary terms and did advocate expansionary monetary and fiscal policies to combat it long before Keynes wrote the General Theory, was better grounded. Even though subsequent research has shown this version of the tradition to be neither as homogeneous, nor as uniquely associated with Chicago, as Friedman claimed, Johnson's characterisation of it as the product of "scholarly chicanery" was at the very least uncharitable and overdone. 8 revolution. The counter-revolution had to endow these scholars, or at least their intellectual successors, with a wisdom vastly superior to what their opponents had credited them with. Obiter dicta and an oral tradition are at least a semi-legitimate scholarly means to this polemical end" (pp. 198-9) With its final sentence removed, this passage could very well stand as a comment on the two paragraphs from Lucas and Sargent (1978) quoted above, but the counter-revolution to which Johnson referred was Friedman's monetarist counter-revolution, the obiter dicta were those of "the great neo-classical quantity theorists" which had been "combed. . .. for any bits of evidence that showed recognition . . . of the fact that a decision to hold money involves a choice between holding money and holding wealth in other forms, and is conditioned by the rates of return on other assets" (p.198), while the "oral tradition" was one associated with the University of Chicago "that was alleged to have preserved understanding of the fundamental truth among a band of the initiated through the dark years of the Keynesian despotism" (p. 198). Johnson's view, Friedman had failed to come to grips with how the effects of monetary shocks divided themselves up between output (and/or employment) and prices, and had relied too much on the methodology of positive economics and too little on general equilibrium theory. Both of these points carried considerable weight, and it is surely no accident that they were directly met 5 James Tobin (1981) referred to the money-supply surprise model at the core of early New classical economics as "monetarism mark 2", and inasmuch as it represented a response to Johnson's challenge to Friedman, this classification is defensible. My own preference, however, has always been to regard its reliance on Walrasian general equilibrium analysis as setting it apart from any earlier macroeconomic doctrines. 9 by the very features that distinguish New classical economics from monetarism: namely, its embedding of the rational expectations hypothesis in a Walrasian framework to produce a shortrun aggregate supply curve, along which output, and therefore employment too, respond to surprise price level movements. 
Rational Expectations and True Models
I did not single out Lucas, Sargent and Wallace for particular attention in the preceding section of this paper without a constructive reason. It was they, above all, who showed the rest of us how fertile John Muth's idea of "rational expectations" could be in simultaneously bringing extra rigour to the logic of macroeconomic theory and empirical novelty to its predictions.
As Sargent and Wallace (1973, p. 328 ) explained it, this hypothesis held that expectations about any variable's behaviour would "depend, in a proper way, on the same things that economic theory says actually determine that variable". Agents were assumed to have the same level of unders tanding of a ny model's behav iour as the econ omist constructing it . The "moneysupply surprise" class of models of cyclical fluctuations that was so popular in the 1970s, and in whose support Lucas and Sargent (1978) deployed the brief history of macroeconomic thought quoted earlier, postulated that agents all believed in the quantity theory of money, had information about the time series proce sses underl ying t he behav iour of the money supply, 6 Beyond doubt the main reason for the failure of money supply surprise models was their assumption that markets cleared instantaneously, with prices set "as if" by a Walrasian auctioneer, which implied that, in aggregate data, the price level would move in response to money supply changes, and that the level of output would respond to the portion of the price level change which had not been anticipated. But it is, and, in the early 1970s, it already was, one of the best known stylised facts in the history of macroeconomics that quantity changes precede those in the price level. The first generation of money supply surprise models simply could not cope with this fact, and that is why those who work with their modern successors have contrived to bring various kinds of price stickiness assumptions back into the picture. 10 formed their expectations accordingly, and then acted on them when interpreting and responding to changes in the nominal prices ruling in the constantly clearing markets in which they were active.
When these models were tested empirically, they were found to be severely wanting. 6 The work that undermined them typically used post-Second-World-War data, usually drawn from the US. During the period over which those data were generated, however, to the extent that there was any dominant theory of price level behaviour within the economics profession, let alone among the public at large, it had nothing to do with the quantity theory of money. Rather it was an eclectic amalgam of "cost-push inflation" ideas, overlaid, from the early 1960s onwards with the idea of an inflation-unemployment trade-off that might be susceptible to "demand-pull" forces; and among the latter forces monetary policy was but one of many. Thus, the economic ideas of the agents whose behaviour underlay the data that the exponents of money supply surprise models were trying to explain were anything but homogenous and bore no resemblance at all to the economic ideas attributed to them in those models.
The point here is quite general. Modern macroeconomics, like all of the sub-discipline's earlier incarnations, builds models which its exponents hope are "true", or at least not proven to be false too quickly. Unlike earlier approaches, however, and this is its great advantage over them in the eyes of its exponents, it postulates that the agents who inhabit those models understand the economy in which they are operating as well as the economist who creates them, 7 Boschen and Grossman's (1981) finding that money supply movements already apparent in published United States data seemed to have subsequent consequences for real economic variables, but that those which were hidden by initial measurement and reporting errors did not, 11 and condition their behaviour upon such knowledge. If we treat the history of economic thought with any degree of seriousness, however, three truths become apparent, and one conjecture becomes plausible: first, in the real world, it is economists, not agents in general, who specialise in creating models of the economy; second, at no time in the past have economists ever provided a single model with an undisputed claim to embody the truth; third, the models that they have provided have always evolved continuously in the face of logical and empirical criticism; and, finally, it seems unlikely that the future is going to differ from the past in any of these respects.
If economic agents do use economic theory to condition their behaviour, therefore, it is possible that, in the same economy at the same time, different agents will react differently to exactly the same information and incentives, and that, as time passes, those reactions are likely to change as the state of economic understanding changes. We should not, therefore, expect that what seems to be the "true model" of the economy for any particular time and place should necessarily be able to explain the behaviour of the economy at any others. Nor, if a model that has been successful in the face of one set of data fails when confronted with a second, should we conclude that its first application was necessarily faulty. If we take the principles used to model the creation and use of expectations that underlie modern macroeconomic theory seriously, that is to say, we seem to be pushed hard in the direction of concluding that empirical economics needs to be informed by a heavy dose of narrative history dealing with ideas, events and their interaction.
Economic Ideas and Economic Policy
Now economic agents in general do show a capacity to learn from experience, and to adapt their behaviour accordingly, but they do not act "as if" they know as much about the economy as the specialists who model it.
7 However, there is one group for whom a literal version of the rational is decisively inconsistent with this view; Jonung and Laidler (1986 ) found that inflation expectations as revealed by Swedish survey data, though unbiased relative to the true variable, could nevertheless have been systematically improved had agents made use of information, such as, for example the lagged unemployment rate, that was already published and readily available to them. 12 expectations hypothesis is more plausible: namely, policy-makers. They routinely have access to professional advice on specific issues, though the fact that there are usually differences of opinion among economists at any time, implies that they have to choose which advice to take.
But their actions can, nevertheless, often be clearly related to specific economic ideas.
The extent to which ideas in general and economic ideas in particular influence economic life and economic policy has long been contentious. On the one hand we have Keynes's well known, and extremely comforting for economists (among others), testimonial:
". . .the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is The old Meade-Tinbergen approach to policy analysis enjoined the policy-maker to assign weights to various policy goals, and then deploy policy tools so as to maximise the resulting s ocial utility function, subject to the co nstraints implied by a model of the eco nomy, and it may be reformulated as a positive exp lanation of how policy makers actually behave. In this guise, it points us to a middle ground between Keynes and Stigler. Economic ideas are used by policy-makers, even when they are self-interested, not just in defence of their policies, but in their design as well, and economics has the task of providing those ideas.
As the economic ideas available to policy makers change, then, so perhaps will their conduct, and Keynes can be right about the importance of ideas, even if the services of those who generate them are, as Stigler suggests, for sale to the highest bidder. When there is a conflict between competing ideas about how the economy works, moreover, the conduct of policy will depend upon the choice of ideas made by those in charge of it. If economic policy is important to the way in which economies behave over time, then, anyone wishing to understand economic data must pay attention to the nature and evolution of the ideas that have underlain policy. In fact, economists often do just that, as I shall now illustrate with reference to work on the Great Contraction of the early 1930s and the Great Inflation of the 1970s.
Two Illustrations: the Great Contraction and the Great Inflation
The Monetary History of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) , and particularly its chapters on the interwar years, is arguably the most influential book written on a macroeconomic topic in the second half of the twentieth century. Anachronistic in approach and technique even at its time of publication, it nevertheless broke the influence of the so-called "Keynesian consensus" about how market economies functioned in general, and had functioned in particular during the 1930s, and it reoriented economists' attention towards the power of monetary forces in a way that still marks the discipline.
It was not, however, Friedman and Schwartz's time series charts of the behaviour of the money supply and related variables that convinced their readers. Rather it was their detailed examination of the evolution of Federal Reserve policy in the 1920s and 1930s, of the way it was affected by the particular personalities of, and interactions among, those who were making it, and of the extent to which it eflected the climate of opinion in which they operated. It was narrative history, rather than state-of-the-art theory and econometrics, that so profoundly changed the views of economists in the 1960s and '70s: strong testimony to the importance then attached to the analysis of the interaction of economic ideas with events as a means of bringing empirical evidence to bear on the assessment of economic theories.
In outlining the causes of the contraction, Friedman and Schwartz gave pride of place to ". . .a sequence of more or less accidental events and the running conflict for power within the the technical personnel . . . were consistently in favor of the policies which seem to us in retrospect the ones that should have been followed" and "stacked the cards heavily in favor of a policy of inaction and drift". Crucially, Friedman and Schwartz concluded that the abovementioned climate of opinion was "certainly a necessary condition" for policy to evolve as it did. (all quotations pp. 593-4), and they described it as one which ". . . in the main regarded recessions and depressions as curative episodes, necessary in order to purge the body economic of the aftereffects of its earlier excesses. The prevailing opinion also confused money with credit; confused the elasticity of one component of the 8 I do not mean to imply that I regard Friedman and Schwartz as having had the last word on these matters. For example, Barry Eichengreen's (1992) work on the role of the gold standard in the international transmission of monetary disturbances in the inter-war years is an important addition to theirs, and shifts the emphasis away from purely domestic United States considerations in what is surely a helpful and constructive way. On the question of the economic thought of the period, it is now widely agreed that they paid insufficient attention to the views of such economists as Allyn Young and Laughlin Currie. See Laidler and Sandilands (2002, forthcoming) on this, and Laidler (1993) , which also gives extensive references to the earlier literature dealing with it. 15 money stock with the elasticity of the total stock; regarded it as desirable that the stock of money should respond to the "needs of trade," rising in expansions and falling in contractions; and attached much greater importance to the maintenance of the gold standard an d the stability of the ex chan ges t han to the maintenance of internal stability.
Most of these attitudes characterized the public at large and not merely the financial community or the Reserve system in particular" (p. 692)
It is worth emphasising that Friedman and Schwartz did not claim that these erroneous economic ideas were universally held, nor that their existence was a sufficient condition for the depression to occur. But they did argue that their prevalence among those who had the upper hand in debates among policy makers had a decisive influence on what was actually done and not done. Furthermore, the contrast that Friedman and Schwartz drew between those ideas, and their own explanation of events based upon a version of the quantity theory of money, was one of the key elements that made their claims about the importance of monetary factors in precipitating the contraction so convincing. We have met the enemy and he is (or rather was) us." (Mayer 1999, p.117) . Patrick Minford (2000) has suggested that this conclusion is quite consonant with Solow's recommendation was endorsed by many macroeconomists and implemented by policy makers." (Sargent 1999, pp. 2 -3 ) The trouble with this story is that Samuelson and Solow (1960) did not urge raising inflation to reduce unemployment, and that policy makers had begun to follow no such recommendation by 1970. As De Long and Mayer document in some detail, their views were altogether more 9 Sargent defends his interpretation of Samuelson and Solow's views on the basis of "reading p.192 of their paper". He acknowledges that qualifications to his interpretation appear on p. 193, but suggests that readers consult Chapter 10 of his book before "thinking that I treat Samuelson and Solow unfairly" (p. 2, fn. 3) . My own suggestion would be that readers also consult pp.192-3 of Samuelson and Solow's paper, or Abba Lerner's (1960) original discussion of it, which gently chides them for not recommending the purchase of less unemployment with more inflation. De Long remarks, with respect to the 1971-74 episode, "Perhaps the policies adopted truly were prudent and optimal given the consensus understanding of the structure of the economy held by both public-and private-sector decision makers. But this consensus understanding was flawed" (p. 267); and, as he might have remarked but didn't, those policies had absolutely nothing to do with deliberately inducing higher inflation in order to reduce the unemployment rate.
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Not that unemployment was unimportant in the policy calculus during the Great Inflation; on the contrary, De Long, and Mayer too, though the latter less forcefully, make a good case that the 1930s cast a long shadow over policy in the 1960s and '70s. But, as De Long and Mayer also show, it was not until the Nixon wage-price control programme failed, and inflation reached double digits that these concerns ceased to manifest themselves mainly in a search for policies that would "shift the Phillips curve" to the left, and began to give rise to an explicitly expressed reluctance to use monetary policy to reduce inflation because of the perceived unemployment costs of doing so.
11
This later development too has roots in the evolution of economic understanding.
Samuelson and Solow did indeed present the Phillips curve as a policy menu in 1960, but that was only one ingredient to what Phelps (1972) would later call "The Cost-Benefit Approach to
Monetary Planning" that became influential for a while in the 1970s. The idea of maximising a social utility function in "Okun gaps" and "Harberger triangles" subject to a Phillips curve constraint had to be developed (Reuber 1962 (Reuber , 1964 , popularised (Johnson 1968 , Tobin 1972 and dynamized (Phelps 1967 (Phelps , 1972 before that could happen. And John Taylor's (1997) suggestion, made in the course of a commentary of De Long's paper, that the arrival shortly thereafter of the rational expectations idea was "influential in changing views both about the costs of reducing inflation and the costs of inflation itself" (p. 279) towards the end of the decade is surely plausible. Now the Great Depression and the Great Inflation are by no means the only episodes in monetary history that have been, or will be subject to study along the lines described above.
Historians of economic thought and economic historians have long been teaching their students about the first two great monetary debates of the 19 th century -the Bullionist and Banking-School -Currency-School, controversies, and their treatment has usually dealt, not only with how versions of the quantity theory of money and the real bills doctrine were deployed in the intellectual arena, but also how those competing doctrines influenced and were influenced by the actual conduct of policy. The later controversy about Bimetallism is susceptible to similar treatment, with the declining influence among economists of the classical cost-of-production theory of value in the face of marginal utility and supply and demand analysis, forming a vital background to the evolution of the views of "practical men" about metallic and managed currencies. And, in due course, as the creation of the Euro passes into history, the economic debates that led up to and accompanied this event will also be studied as a necessary guide to understanding the evidence about the workings of the monetary system that it will generate.
Concluding Comment
Historians of economic thought have routinely taken an approach to their work that is broadly consistent with what modern macroeconomic theory has to say about the role of ideas in conditioning economic behaviour. Perhaps they should take as much pleasure from the knowledge that this is so as did M. Jourdain from the discovery that he had been speaking prose all along, and find therein ample compensation for the discomfort that they feel when they see their subject being used, or misused, as a rhetorical device to justify the claims of particular economic ideas to professional attention. There is, after all, as we have seen, nothing new about this latter practice.
Even so, despite its continuing and widespread use for both persuasive and substantive purposes, there are grounds for disquiet about the current status of the history of thought in modern economics. The fact is that Lucas and Sargent's rhetorical deployment of historical arguments, discussed above, attracted far less attention and generated far less debate than did
Friedman's earlier excursion into the area. This is not surprising, for Friedman's main critics were Don Patinkin (1969) and Johnson (1971) , each of them a major figure in monetary theory in his own right, but each of them, by virtue of his training and understanding of the nature of the sub-discipline, well steeped in its history, and convinced of the importance of that history for understanding contemporary issues. Nowadays "ancestor worship" is regarded by leading figures of the discipline as no more than an entertaining consumption good, so there is no professional gain to be had from critically examining any claims that might be made about the historical legitimacy of contemporary doctrines. Nor is there much point in graduate students taking courses in the area, and in departments offering them.
There is surely something amiss about the History of Economic Thought being used as a rhetorical weapon, in support of the intellectual credentials of their own work, by the same leading figures who denigrate the field's importance. The skills that would enable their intended audience to assess such arguments on their merits are, increasingly, not being taught. All this, when the substantive theoretical ideas that are defended by these means themselves imply that a knowledge of the economics of the past is critical to disciplining the empirical application and further development of those very ideas. In neglecting the History of Economic Thought, and discouraging its study, modern macroeconomic theorists are turning their backs on a tool of considerable potential, while simultaneously creating an intellectual monopoly for themselves in its rhetorical deployment. A quiet life may be the best of monopoly profits, but it will not be conducive to the longer term health of economics if they are allowed to enjoy such a life for much longer.
